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Abstract 
This paper briefly identifies some of the more important issues raised by the 
finding of the Market Misconduct Tribunal that CITIC's non-disclosure of price 
sensitive information at a time when it made a no material adverse change 
statement did not amount to market misconduct for the purposes of section 277 
of the Securities and Futures Ordinance. It is suggested that the causal 
relationship between "no change" public announcements and maintenance is 
inadequately explored, and that the Tribunal's interpretative process and 
approach to the listing rules is inappropriately circumscribed. The case has left 
the market in an unsatisfactory situation in a number of regards. 
 
 
 
 
The Market Misconduct Tribunal recently found that a no material adverse change 
(“no-MAC”) statement published by CITIC Limited in 2008 did not constitute 
market misconduct under s. 277 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“SFO”) 
because the statement was unlikely to influence the market price of CITIC 
securities, and because it was not materially false or misleading.  
 
This came as a surprise to many because at the time of the statement, directors 
of CITIC were aware of but had not disclosed to the market that it was facing 
significant mark-to-market losses on foreign currency derivative contracts. When 
disclosed to the market weeks later, CITIC’s share price plunged, wiping out 
around HK$20 billion, or two-thirds, of its market capitalisation.  
 
This article identifies some of the more important issues raised by the Tribunal’s 
findings and the SFC’s decision not to appeal. 
 
The “Likely To” Element 
 
For a breach of s. 277 to be established, the no-MAC statement must have been 
likely to, inter alia, maintain, increase, reduce or stabilize the price of CITIC’s 
securities. This requires a potential causative effect in the market. The Tribunal 
understood this to mean likely to induce the investing public to deal, so as to 
undermine the open and honest workings of the market. Given the absence of 
any measurable effect of the no-MAC statement on CITIC’s share price, the 
Tribunal’s focus fell on the concepts of maintaining or stabilizing.  
 
The purpose of a no-MAC statement is presumably to facilitate shareholders 
evaluate the merits of a transaction against the background knowledge that it is 
“business as usual” in relation to all other aspects of the company’s affairs. Hence 
it is logical to focus on the concept of “maintenance” when considering the likely 
effect of a no-MAC statement. However, because maintenance seeks to preserve 
an existing state of affairs, the assessment of causality requires careful 
consideration.  
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The Tribunal concluded that the no-MAC statement was not likely to have the 
effect of maintaining CITIC’s share price because it was a routine statement 
relating to a transaction that was very likely to pass unnoticed by the market, 
and because of the absence of any prevailing trend or volatility in CITIC’s share 
price at the time of the statement. This view appears to be inconsistent with the 
practice of listed companies and their advisers relating to MAC statements – they 
are generally considered to be a significant requirement, are not made lightly and 
are subject to rigorous internal procedural controls (as was the case with CITIC). 
Given this, it is hard to accept that they are not at least potentially important in 
terms of their market effect. In other words, a company’s comment on its MAC 
position is the type of information that the market pays attention to – open 
markets rely on a continuous assessment of the total mix of available information 
and a no-MAC statement is a confirmation no less than is a statement there has 
been a MAC.  
 
Recognising this requires a developed appreciation of the causal relationship 
between “no change” public announcements and maintenance. The Tribunal in 
Sunny Global (2008) accepted that “no change” announcements could underpin 
investor sentiment and maintain or stabilize share prices. The SFC has also 
warned that negative confirmations may be misleading because they can mask 
the impact of other factors (newsletter April 2015). One might compare this to 
the position of the captain (the decision maker) of a ship: his receipt of 
confirmation that the tide remains the same “maintains” his decision to stay on 
the present course just as an omission to provide him with information that an 
iceberg lays dead ahead does. The US Supreme Court long ago recognised the 
importance of omissions to shareholder behaviour without requiring anything 
more than asking whether there would be a reasonable likelihood that the 
omitted fact would have assumed tangible significance in its deliberations (TSC 
Industries v Northway 426 US 438 (1976), which has been judicially approved in 
the Singapore Court of Appeal). 
 
Interpretative Process  
 
An important step in the Tribunal’s reasoning was that CITIC’s no-MAC statement 
had been made pursuant to a requirement in the listing rules, which provided no 
definition of the term. 
 
Undertaking an interpretation that sought to give the words their natural and 
ordinary meaning, unless the context and purpose points to a different meaning, 
the Tribunal concluded the MAC phrase meant that the financial integrity of the 
company must have been undermined for an enduring period. It is unclear why 
the Tribunal’s analysis of MAC phrases used in a loan default scenario, such as 
the Grupo Hotelero case, is germane to its use in an equity context. No analysis 
was undertaken of the background to the listing rule inclusion of the MAC 
statement requirement, nor of the major and connected transaction scenarios 
provided for in the listing rules that trigger MAC statements, nor the Exchange’s 
guidance on the phrase in its HKEX-GL41-12. Moreover, no account was made of 
how the Tribunal’s interpretation would serve the needs of shareholders assessing 
a proposed transaction – that it would be of little assistance suggests the 
Tribunal’s interpretation may be inconsistent with a core purpose of the listing 
rules.  
 
That the MAC requirement in LR Chapters 14/14A does not contain the same 
language as LR13.09 appeared relevant to the Tribunal’s treatment of the MAC 
requirement as an “independent obligation”. However, unlike legislation, listing 
rules are far more directive in nature. LR13.09 is a continuing obligation and the 
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listing rules do not treat information disclosures as existing in segregated silos: 
LR2.13 specifically requires information in any announcement to be complete, not 
misleading or deceptive, or present risk factors in a misleading way. 
 
The primary question of course is not breaches of the listing rules but whether 
CITIC’s no-MAC statement was false or misleading or omitted material facts for 
statutory purposes. If the obligation to make a MAC statement was not an 
independent one then omitting other information the market would expect to be 
disclosed in compliance with the listing rules would be relevant to consider for 
this purpose – much like the ship captain’s position in the analogy above. In SFC 
v. Wong Shu Wing and Another [2013] HKCFI 2302, the court recognised that 
listing rule disclosure requirements are relevant to the information a shareholder 
might reasonably expect to receive for statutory purposes (s. 214 SFO). 
Alternatively, if one followed the Tribunal’s approach, would a circular issued 
pursuant to LR Chapter 14 not be misleading even though it failed to mention a 
connected party element as required by LR Chapter 14A? 
 
The Tribunal’s position leaves the market in an unsatisfactory situation. The utility 
of MAC statements to equity investors has been greatly diminished, and much 
uncertainty is introduced as to whether a statement pursuant to one provision of 
the listing rules has any bearing on compliance with other requirements. These 
are concerns that continue following the introduction of Part XIVA SFO 
particularly where a disclosure may be made pursuant to the listing rules to 
facilitate a corporate transaction at a time when the issuer is also withholding 
inside information pursuant to an applicable safe harbour. 
 
The Macroscopic Perspective 
 
When considering the CITIC case, one can also reflect on the Andrew Left/Citron 
case earlier this year in which a short seller was found by the Tribunal to have 
committed market misconduct under s. 277 as a result of issuing a report without 
conducting adequate due diligence. That case raised concerns related to the 
potential stifling of negative commentary in the market. In contrast, to find that 
CITIC is able to engage in corporate opacity of considerably greater proportions 
while at the same time pursuing other corporate objectives presents a 
macroscopic anomaly – company insiders acting opaquely appear to be held to 
lower standards than are applied to negative commentators. This suggests an 
erratic valuation of the free flow of information in a transparent market.  
 
In the pre-Part XIVA context of the CITIC facts, the decision to use s. 277 was 
likely motivated by the lack of hard sanctions available for a breach of LR13.09 
and the possibility of obtaining compensation under s. 213 SFO for shareholders 
who had incurred losses. However, the failure before the Tribunal and the SFC’s 
decision not to appeal has left shareholders without a real prospect for a remedy. 
It also leaves the market with an interpretation of how the listing rules operate 
that is at odds with commercial practice and lacks investor utility, putting the 
Exchange and the SFC in something of a conundrum as to whether to clarify the 
operation of the MAC statement requirement for it to service investor interests, or 
just to rewrite the disclosure requirement more unequivocally. The decision not to 
appeal also appears to sit uncomfortably with the SFC’s recent efforts to highlight 
an enforcement priority as being corporate wrongdoing that wipes out market 
value and impacts the integrity of the market. Further clarification of s. 277 will 
need to wait. 
